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______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-18-cr-00392-001) 
District Court Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on 
July 12, 2021  
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, GREENAWAY, JR. and RESTREPO Circuit Judges 
 









* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
Artavius Horne (“Appellant”) appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for a 
new trial. In its exceptionally thorough Memorandum, the district court explained why it 
allowed the government to introduce his prior guilty plea during this trial. We can add 
little to the district court’s fine opinion. Accordingly, we will only briefly explain why 
the court was correct and why we will affirm the conviction.1 
I. 
We review the district court’s admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion.2 
Horne argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the government to 
introduce evidence of his prior state conviction for sex trafficking minors after twice 
denying the government’s motions in limine to admit that evidence. The court did 
initially deny the motion in limine because it concluded that the probative value of his 
prior conviction for promoting prostitution of minors was “substantially outweighed” by 
the risk of unfair prejudice.3 
However, during the trial, Horne took the witness stand and denied ever 
prostituting a minor. He repeated that denial during the defense counsel’s redirect 
examination. At that point, the court granted a renewed government motion to admit the 
prior guilty plea to prostituting a minor and appropriately instructed the jury that the prior 
conviction was only admissible insofar as it may be relevant to Horne’s credibility. The 
 
1 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
2 United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).  




court did so even though it refused to allow the government to introduce the prior 
conviction when Horne initially denied prior involvement with prostituting a minor.4 The 
court’s caution is commendable. However, the court quite appropriately concluded that 
the Rule 403 balance tipped in favor of admitting the prior guilty plea because of the 
added weight of the defendant’s second denial of involvement with minors. We agree that 
the defendant’s attempt to exploit the court’s caution altered the 403 balance. The court 
quite appropriately admitted the evidence solely to allow the government to impeach 
Horne’s credibility and gave appropriate limiting instructions to the jury.5  
The court’s handling of Horne’s prior conviction was exemplary. Horne’s 
argument to the contrary relies on the erroneous claim that the government “opened the 
door” to introducing inadmissible evidence by playing a videotaped interview between 
Horne and the FBI.6 However, he misinterprets the evidentiary doctrine of “opening the 
door.” That principle merely provides that “when one party introduces inadmissible 
evidence, the opposing party thereafter may introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence to 
rebut or explain the prior evidence.”7 In challenging the application of that principle here, 
Horne also ignores that the recording of the FBI interview was carefully redacted. Horne 
 
4 App. 52 (“Horne’s second denial ‘substantially elevated the probative value,’ thereby 
tilting the balance in favor of admission.”).   
5 App. 194 (“And you are to consider the fact that Mr. Horne was convicted of that 
charge in Bucks County, Pennsylvania only for purposes of assessing his credibility in 
this case and not to help you determine whether or not he is guilty of this charge.”).  
6 Appellant’s Br. 16 (“[T]he government should not have been able to claim that 
appellant opened the door regarding appellant’s denial because it had previously 
introduced evidence about appellant’s denial that he prostituted minors.”). 




placed his credibility at issue by taking the stand and the district court properly allowed 
the government to introduce evidence relevant to his credibility under these 
circumstances.8 He should not now be surprised that the trial court was not willing to 
allow him to exploit the caution it showed when initially ruling that the prior guilty plea 
would not be admitted. 
II. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the district court’s denial of 
Appellant’s motion for a new trial. 
 
8 See United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2007) (Impeachment by 
contradiction is a means of “policing the ‘defendant’s obligation to speak the truth in 
response to proper questions.’”) (quoting United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 
(1980)); see also United States v. Gilmore, 553 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2009).  
